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Representation and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence

(Seminar, 134013 – 2SWS)

1. Description and objectives

The overarching questions behind this seminar are: 1) are political representation and distributive policy outcomes related? and 2) if so, *how* and *why*? The first question can be understood to run in two directions. On the one hand, it asks about the distributive consequences of political representation. On the other hand, it asks about the political consequences of distributive policies.

This seminar challenges you to answer the second question with respect to both directions. In doing so, it disintegrates the concepts of 'representation' and 'redistribution' in their finer parts. The themes are split along two levels of political representation: PART I is about the effect of *individuals* such as citizens or groups of citizens (rich, poor and the middle class; urban and rural; voters and non-voters; enfranchised and disenfranchised); PART II is about the effect of territorial *aggregates* such as regions or states (small and large; over- and under-represented; urban and rural). PART III draws these directions together into a circle to ask a bigger question: can political and distributive inequality coexist and if so, when and how?

Political representation and distributive outcomes are inherently about (in)equality and part of the conceptual task throughout the seminar is to untangle what we understand by that. For the most part, although not exclusively, the topics speak about distributive inequality as inequality in income or wealth and about political inequality as inequality in various voting characteristics (such as rights, participation or preferences). We will have the chance to challenge these conceptions. Nevertheless, having settled on an understanding of inequality, our primary task is to explore questions such as: *how* can political equality lead to distributive equality and *does* it? *how* can the support for and adoption of specific policies alleviate or aggravate economic inequality and *does* it? *how* can underlying demographic changes affect policy outcomes through the political process and *do* they?

The *how* in these questions is about the causal mechanism(s) between the respective phenomena: it asks about the channels through which representation could (possibly) affect distribution and vice versa – theory gives us various hypotheses about these mechanisms. The *do(es)* part is about what actually is the case: it asks whether the channels posited by theory are supported by the facts – empirical evi-

dence gives us these facts. Your task in this seminar is to work with both theory and evidence in uncovering and *critically* discussing possible and credible explanations of the relation between representation and (re)distribution.

Hence, completing the seminar successfully implies demonstrating the ability to answer two groups of questions (at least, with respect to your chosen topic):

1. KNOWLEDGE: What is a possible explanation/are possible explanations of the relation between representation and (re)distribution with respect to your topic (knowledge of theory)? What are some of the key empirical facts pertaining to your topic that support or undermine this explanation(s) (knowledge of evidence)?

2. CRITICAL THINKING: How do you reconcile the theory with the evidence? Are other explanations compatible with the facts and if so, how and why? Are there possible shortcomings in your chosen explanation(s) and if yes, how would they affect its implications?

Note that the central aims of the seminar are towards challenging you to think about what *could* be and *is* the case (as well as *why* it might be or is). Coming up with answers to these questions, however, does not imply that what could be or is the case is what *should* be the case. For example, if you argue that – through some channel – certain types of spending aggravate distributive inequality (topic 5), this need not imply that these types of spending *should* be suspended. This normative jump needs further premises and you are free and encouraged to discuss the normative implications, if any, of your topic – just be aware that they need extra motivation.

2. Structure

This is a semi-blocked seminar which means that we will meet twice during the semester – two days in early June and two days in late July – at which point each student will make a presentation on a topic from the syllabus.[1]

Each meeting will run as a panel conference. That is to say, over two days each topic will be covered by: 1) a main presentation by a student, 2) followed by a discussant giving a commentary, 3) followed by an open discussion – among the presenter, the discussant and the audience – chaired by a third student. In other words, during each meeting each student will take on four roles (for guidelines and requirements, see the Assessment section):

1. PRESENTER: As a presenter, you are tasked with giving a critical overview of the topic.

2. DISCUSSANT: As a discussant, you should engage with the topic by providing an informed commentary.

3. CHAIR: As a chair, your task is to maintain, organise and guide the discussion.

[1] Depending on the number of students, it is possible to have group presentations (two students sharing a topic). The final papers, however, if you opt for 5CP/6CP, are individual.

4. AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: As an audience participant, it is your responsibility to chime in during the discussion – ask questions, including anything you might not have understood, raise issues, make suggestions for improvement, etc. Remember that you yourself will be a presenter, a discussant and a chair on different topics, so be active but polite to your fellow students.

3. Assessment

Economics BA students can take the seminar as 'Seminar zu Institutionen und Governance' under 'Modulbereich SPEZ/Spezialisierungsbereich: Institutionen und Governance' (5CP), according to the new regulations. According to the old regulations, it can be taken as an 'Individueller Schwerpunkt' seminar (5CP) under 'Modulbereich IS'.

Internationale Wirtschaft & Entwicklung BA students can take the seminar as 'Modul IG 4: Governanceökonomik II - Themen' under 'Modulbereich Spezialisierung/Individueller Schwerpunkt/ Schwerpunktbereich IG: Institutionen und Governance' (5CP), according to the new regulations. According to the old regulations, it can be taken as an 'Individueller Schwerpunkt' seminar (5CP) under 'Modulbereich IS'.

Philosophy & Economics BA students can take this as a P3* or a P6.iii seminar for 2CP (ungraded) or 5CP (graded), according to the new regulations. According to the old regulations, this can be taken as a P6 seminar for 2CP (ungraded) or 6CP (graded).

Tables 1 and 2 summarise the assessment elements depending on the CPs you opt for. On each of the two meetings, a topic will be discussed for 1.5 hours with more time for open discussion during the first than the second meeting – see Table 3. The following explains the elements and gives you some guidance.

1. 2ND PRESENTATION (ORAL)

   Your final presentation (in July) should cover both the theory and evidence part outlined above. In other words, you should take your topic and, first, be able to clearly present a possible set of causal mechanisms that explain its relevant phenomena. For example, under topic 6, you should be able to explain the channels through which different types of electoral systems (majoritarian vs proportional representation) lead to different distributive outcomes. Second, you should be aware of and present some of the evidence that supports or undermines this explanation. Finally, although not necessarily in that order, you should critically discuss how theory and evidence work together or against each other with respect to your explanation. (Your critical discussion could also cover normative issues you might want to raise.)

   Your explanation of the causal mechanisms underlying your topic could be based on a formal model or a less formal/informal theory.[2] The readings supply both kinds of hypotheses. Nevertheless, try to be as specific as you can without the risk of losing the audience. A model or a theory always rests on

[2] The only exception is topic 1 which is based on a formal – but easy – model: the student presenting on this topic should engage with this model.

TABLE 1: **2CP**

1st Presentation (June)				2nd Presentation (July)			
Report 1 (*5%*)	&	Presentation (*15%*)	20%	Report 2 (*10%*)	&	Presentation (*40%*)	50%
Commentary 1 (*2.5%*)	&	Discussion (*5%*)	7.5%	Commentary 2 (*5%*)	&	Discussion (*10%*)	15%
		Chair	2.5%			Chair	5%
			30%				**70%**

TABLE 2: **5CP/6CP**

1st Presentation (June)				2nd Presentation (July)				Paper	
Report 1 (*3%*)	&	Presentation (*7%*)	10%	Report 2 (*5%*)	&	Presentation (*25%*)	30%	Paper	35%
Commentary 1 (*2.5%*)	&	Discussion (*5%*)	7.5%	Commentary 2 (*3%*)	&	Discussion (*7%*)	10%		
		Chair	2.5%			Chair	5%		
			20%				**45%**		**35%**

TABLE 3: **Time allocation per topic**

1st Presentation (June)		2nd Presentation (July)	
Presentation	≈ 30 min	Presentation	≈ 45 min
Student discussion	≈ 10 min	Student discussion	≈ 20 min
Chaired open discussion	≈ 50 min	Chaired open discussion	≈ 25 min
	1 hour 30 min		**1 hour 30 min**

TABLE 4: **Report/Commentary length**

1st Presentation (June)		2nd Presentation (July)	
Report 1	≈ 3–4 pages	Report 2	≈ 5–6 pages
Commentary 1	≈ 1–2 pages	Commentary 2	≈ 3–4 pages

certain assumptions, so be clear about those. Additionally, they always follow a path of reasoning which drives their conclusions – be clear and as detailed as possible on these too.

In your critical discussion do not just say, for example, that the assumptions are wrong. For instance, one assumption of the Meltzer-Richard model in topic 1 is that everyone votes. If you want to challenge that, do not just say that this is not the case and, hence, the model and its conclusions are 'wrong'. Rather, discuss clearly how changing the assumption could be consequential: would the explanation change if you assume that only some people vote? What is important is not that the assumptions of a model/theory are wrong (taken literally, most assumptions are); rather, a critical point would explain what, if anything, is 'wrong' with them being wrong.

2. 1ST PRESENTATION (ORAL)

   The first presentation (in June) is meant to be (and will be evaluated as) work-in-progress. The goal is to have roughly about half of the work done: for example, depending on how you split your work, you could be done with the theory or evidence part. In any case, a general advice is to start with the theory part, especially if you work with a formal model.

   As work-in-progress, part of your first presentation could cover points you are grappling with – if there are such points, send an e-mail and/or come to office hours! If in June there is still something you have trouble understanding, formulate it as a specific question: explain what you do not understand exactly or what you do not find convincing, all of us are there to give you feedback. In addition to what you have done and what you have trouble doing, your presentation should cover what you plan to do until July: in what direction(s) do you intend to take your presentation? Feel free to play with ideas: for example, you can suggest possible lines of critical discussion and what you would need to do/find in order to carry them out. Again, we are there to think about these possibilities together with you.

   All in all, treat the first presentations as extended group office hours where each student comes prepared with part of the work already done and with specific questions and specific ideas for the remainder of the work.

3. REPORTS (WRITTEN)

   The reports (1 and 2 – see Table 4 for how long these should be) are summaries of what you will be doing during the presentation. These are not papers or essays, so be concise but specific: outline briefly what the main problem behind your presentation is (as related to your topic) and then explain what you have done and/or will be doing. Think of them as extended paper proposals in the case of report 1 and extended paper abstracts in the case of report 2.

   You can use your first report as a basis for your second report – just make sure to edit it accordingly, depending on the feedback you get and the changes you eventually decide to make.

Note that the report to your presentation is due about a week before the presentation date (see Overall timing). All reports (and commentaries) will be made available to all students: this will allow the respective chairs to get a sense of the topic they will be chairing and to think about possible ways of organising the discussion. Everyone is encouraged, though not obliged, to read the reports of everyone else in preparation for the discussions in class.

4. STUDENT DISCUSSIONS (ORAL)

   In addition to presenting on their chosen topic, each student will also be a discussant on one other topic (see Table 3 for how long these should be). Students will be paired so that their topics are related. As a discussant, your task is to comment on the presentation in an informed way: you can quickly summarise what, in your opinion, the point of the presentation is and follow up with critical observations, open questions or suggestions for improvements. Your commentary will serve as a basis for the open discussion later on.

5. COMMENTARIES (WRITTEN)

   The commentaries are written summaries of your planned oral discussion in class (see Table 4 for how long these should be). Follow the same strategy: summarise quickly what you take the main point of the report/presentation to be and then proceed with your comments.

   Again, you can use your first commentary as a basis for your second commentary – note, however, that you might have to edit it substantially. The point of the commentaries and discussions is to make you engage with at least one other topic more fully and for each student to get at least one more reflective feedback from the audience (in addition to the feedback you will get from me). Hence, the arguments in your first commentary will most likely be somewhat if not fully addressed in the second presentation: if so, you need to think whether they have been addressed well and what other points you could raise.

   Note that the commentaries are due five days in advance (see Overall timing). The best way to write a commentary is to meet your 'pair' – ideally, a couple of times – and discuss their topic: what the basic problem is, how they plan to explain it, etc. You can then write your commentary on the basis of these discussions. You can also ask them to send you a list of the readings they plan to use – this will allow you to get acquainted with some finer points around their topic. You will have three extra days for finishing your commentary after your 'pair' submits their report but the optimal strategy is to have most of it finished before that.

   General advice: Get in touch with your 'pair' as soon as the topics are allocated. Talk or e-mail regularly over their progress – this will help you in getting a timely sense of their topic but also help them in testing their ideas while these ideas are still in progress.

   Like the reports, the commentaries will be made available to all students: to help out the chairs but also to allow everyone to get acquainted with the other topics in advance (if they wish to).

6. CHAIRS

In addition to being a presenter on a topic and a discussant on another topic, each student will also chair the open discussion of a third topic. This means that you might have to prepare some questions in advance or come up with them while listening to the presenter/discussant – it is up to you. You will have the report and the commentary on the respective topic about a week in advance, so feel free to go through them during this time.

As a chair, your task is to guide and maintain the discussion. You are free to choose how to do that. For example, you could start by inviting the presenter to respond to the discussant's points; you could also allow them to interact for some time before opening the discussion to the audience. (Feel free to talk among yourselves how you three prefer to do it.) You could also immediately invite the audience, or even kick off with your own question/observation. You could distinguish different questions: say, clarificatory vs substantive. You could decide to collect a number of questions to be answered in bulk or take them one by one. You could participate in the discussion or decide to simply guide it. Come up with a format you think works best, the crucial thing is – it is your responsibility to ensure a lively and orderly discussion.

7. PAPER

The final paper (for 5CP/6CP students) should be about 15 pages written work on the topic of your presentation. In other words, turn your presentation – including all the feedback and critical responses you receive during the discussions – into a critical essays on the causal mechanisms between the relevant phenomena, using the evidence you have already found plus additional findings you decide or might need to use.

There is just one requirement pertaining to your critical discussion: you should relate – even if briefly – your chosen topic to at least *two* other topics from the syllabus (say, in a paragraph each or more, if you prefer). In order to do this, you could read the relevant papers from the syllabus, use the respective reports and commentaries, use your notes from the two meetings or meet and discuss with the respective presenters.

8. TOPICS

Your topic across the two presentations should be the same, i.e. switching from one topic to another over the two presentations is not allowed.

Nevertheless, if – in the process of your research or during the discussions – you find another topic more interesting, it is possible to write your final paper on it instead: the essay topic is flexible and you can choose something else from the syllabus or a topic that is not in the syllabus but nevertheless related.

9. FORMAT

As a presenter, you can prepare slides or hand-outs or both – it is up to you. Nevertheless, keep in mind that for the evidence part, having some slides might be most practical (and helpful for the audience).

As a discussant or a chair, you do not need to prepare slides or hand-outs. Nevertheless, if you want to lay out some questions or observations for open discussion and believe that a hand-out would be helpful, feel free to use that.

If you want a hand-out printed out for the class, e-mail it a day in advance.

For all written assignments, use a standard 12pt font (for example but not necessarily, Times New Roman) with 1.25 line spacing. Use standard margins ($\approx$ 2.5cm all around) and no extra kerning (no expanding/shrinking the space between characters). Do not forget to properly reference your texts – the style is up to you, just be consistent. References and appendices do not contribute to the page count.

You will receive a grade on each of the assessment elements for your CPs (the only pass/fail element is 'chairing'). Your final grade will be a weighted average (as per Table 1 or 2) across all elements. For 2CP students, if your final grade is a passing grade, you get a 'pass'; otherwise, you get a 'fail'.

Note that the time allocation break-down in Table 3 is more suggestive than absolutely obligatory. Unless the presenter prefers not to be interrupted (mention this at the start), it is often useful to bring up and address some questions already during the presentation. All in all, each topic lasts an hour and a half but in-between we need not stick to a strict presentation-commentary-open discussion sequence.

4. A note on the literature

The topics in this seminar are at the fascinating intersection of a number of disciplines: from economics, including political economy and economic history, through political science, to sociology. The readings to the topics try to do justice to this cross-fertilisation by drawing as much as possible from all these disciplines. As political presentation and economic (in)equality are central to political science and economics, these are the fields represented most heavily. Nevertheless, in your engagement with the suggested readings and beyond, you are encouraged to read widely and draw on distinct strands of the literature.

5. Deadlines

To ensure that everything runs smoothly, the report and commentary deadlines will be enforced in the following way: being a day late reduces your respective grade by 50%; being two days late reduces it by 100%.

We can be a bit more flexible with the paper deadline: if for some reason you need more time, send an e-mail.

6. Language

The language of the course is English.

7. Prerequisites

Some familiarity with social choice theory and basic game theory is helpful. Additionally, some knowledge of econometrics (knowing how to read regression and summary statistics tables) is also helpful. Much of PART I is directly or indirectly

related to the median voter theorem, single-peaked preferences and/or the so called single-crossing property – you will receive notes that explain these concepts at an introductory level.

8. Registration

Send an e-mail (Marina1.Uzunova@uni-bayreuth.de) until **midnight, 13 April (Thursday)**. Include the following:

- Last name, first name;
- Degree (e.g., Economics BA);
- Semester;
- Matriculation number;
- Planned CP (e.g., 5CP): you can change this later;
- Bereich (e.g., P3*);
- A ranking of three topics in order of most preferred to least preferred: I will try to give each of you your preferred topic as best as possible; if necessary, I will use the time of registration as a tie-breaking rule.

You will receive a note of acceptance/rejection and an allocated topic on 14 April (Friday).

Note that the allocation of places by mid-April is final. If at any point during the semester you decide not to continue, *send an e-mail as soon as possible*. This is important in order to avoid in a timely and non-stressful manner any students (submitting a commentary on your topic) being affected negatively. In such a case, we can discuss options ensuring that no one is disadvantaged.

9. Questions

Feel free to e-mail with any questions or visit during office hours (or at any other time – send a note to arrange a time). E-mail: Marina1.Uzunova@uni-bayreuth.de.

10. Conduct and honesty

A word about electronic devices: you are free to use your laptops during our meetings. However, you are heartily discouraged from doing so. Taking notes with a simple pen and paper is much more effective. Additionally, avoiding electronic devices reduces the risk of being distracted: everyone benefits when each of us tries to pay as much attention as humanly possible!

And a word about academic integrity: passing off someone else's work as your own (plagiarism) is wrong and a serious offence.

Overall timing

Date		Hour	Room	Deadline	Discussion
04 April	(Tue)	14:00 – 16:00	S 44 (RW)		Preliminary (organisational) meeting
13 April	(Thu)	Midnight		Registration	
24 May	(Wed)	Midnight		Report 1	
27 May	(Sat)	Midnight		Commentary 1	
02 June	(Fri)	09:00 – 18:00	S 46 (RW)		1st presentations and discussions
03 June	(Sat)	09:00 – 18:00	S 46 (RW)		
19 July	(Wed)	Midnight		Report 2	
22 July	(Sat)	Midnight		Commentary 2	
28 July	(Fri)	09:00 – 18:00	S 46 (RW)		2nd presentations and discussions
29 July	(Sat)	09:00 – 18:00	S 46 (RW)		
15 Sep	(Fri)	Midnight		Paper	

The preliminary meeting on 04 April is not compulsory. It will provide a general overview of the themes in this seminar as well as answer any questions you might have before deciding whether to register. If you have questions but cannot make it, get in touch via e-mail.

Schedule: 02–03 June

Tba

02 June: Topics 1–5
03 June: Topics 6–10

Schedule: 28–29 July

Tba

28 July: Topics 1–5
29 July: Topics 6–10

Topics & Literature

The following is a short description of the topics plus some recommended literature from which to start. Note that you are expected to find additional literature but free not to use some of the readings listed here that you find unhelpful. Readings marked with [E] are recommended for everyone. Readings marked with [R] are recommended for the respective topic.

[E] = Recommended reading for everyone

[R] = Recommended reading for the topic

You will quickly realise, if you have not already, that you need not – and cannot – read every single paper on the topic. In fact, you need not read all the papers you choose to work with in their entirety – a good starting strategy is to quickly survey the literature by reading the relevant parts of many papers/books. Take notes in the process: crucial points, points mentioned repeatedly, potential criticism, etc. Note the source of these points – otherwise, you will not remember where you have read them. Once you are familiar with the literature, you would need to engage with at least some papers more deeply. Use the references in these papers for further sources or consult an electronic platform, such as Google Scholar: find an article and check the papers which cite it.

PART I: INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION

PART I

The first part of the seminar covers general theories of the link between representation and redistribution. These are hypotheses whose direction could run either way (from electoral features to distributive outcomes and vice versa) or could consist of various channels feeding through in a more circular fashion. Some central issues are: how income and electoral distributions drive policy outcomes through the political process; how the structure of the electoral system affects public spending across the population; how types of public spending affect distinct groups of voters differentially. Our concern here is primarily with effects on *individuals* or groups (classes) of individuals. In PART II, we go a step higher and focus on aggregates such as regions/states and countries.

GENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART I:

Persson and Tabellini (2000)
The standard political economy textbook. See 'Part II: Distributive Politics' for relevant topics.

Glaeser (2006)
Gradstein and Milanovic (2004)
Harms and Zink (2003)
Survey articles.

Besley and Case (2003)
Another survey article – albeit much more extensive – with a focus on the US. See particularly section 5.1 (pp. 24–29) and section 6 (pp. 36–45).

1. The Meltzer-Richard model

TOPIC 1

MAJORITARIAN POLITICS

SINGLE-ISSUE (TAX) POLITICS

REDISTRIBUTION FROM RICH TO POOR

GENERAL TAX & TRANSFER

OFFICE-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

The Meltzer-Richard (MR) model, also known as the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard model, is the starting point of almost any discussion in distributive politics. Relying on the median voter theorem, it is a very simple – and simplified – benchmark (with dubious empirical support) for most other topics. In fact, you will see this model mentioned and discussed repeatedly throughout your preparation for any of the other topics. For this reason, you are well advised to get acquainted with it, at least at an intuitive level, even if you are not presenting, discussing or chairing on it.

LITERATURE:

Meltzer and Richard (1978: 116–118) [R], [E]
The perfect place to start – an exclusively intuitive description.

Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983)
Romer (1975)
Roberts (1977)
The original papers introducing the model.

Persson and Tabellini (2000: 118–123) [R]
Londregan (2006) [R]
Mueller (2003: 512–519)
Borck (2007) [R]
Milanovic (2000)
Simple presentations, discussions and relevant empirical studies. Persson and Tabellini's and Londregan's texts are perhaps the simplest presentations. Nevertheless, if you find another text more helpful, you can use that.

Bonica, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2013) [E]
A survey of the reasons why the MR model might be misguided.

Lipset (1959)
A sociological perspective.

2. Political participation

TOPIC 2

MAJORITARIAN POLITICS

One of the key assumptions driving the MR model is (at least, near) universal electoral turnout. This, even casual observa-

tion suggests, is not the case. The level of electoral turnout is important here at least through two channels: 1) Its relation to inequality: is income related to voting and if so, how? 2) Its feedback effect through public policy: if certain groups are more likely to vote and, hence, affect policy outcomes, do these outcomes reinforce or alleviate inequality?

LOWER REDISTRIBUTION

OFFICE-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

LITERATURE:

Franzese (2001)
Brady (2003) [R]
Borck (2002)
Various hypotheses on the effect of participation.

Nelson (1999) [R]
Lijphart (1997)
Mahler (2008)
Mueller and Stratmann (2003)
Besley and Case (2003: 24–29)
These papers should give you a good overview of the empirical 'stylised facts' around the topic.

3. Suffrage

TOPIC 3

One of the implications of the MR model is that extending the franchise to lower income groups leads to more redistributive politics. It is particularly fruitful to analyse this topic from a *historical* perspective: how has the progress of ethnic, gender and property rights suffrage movements affected policy outcomes in various countries? From a *contemporary* point of view, the topic is pertinent to the rising wave of immigration and the presence of large swathes of non-citizens. Note that political participation and suffrage are two distinct concepts: universal participation does not imply universal suffrage (and vice versa).

MAJORITARIAN POLITICS

OFFICE-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

LITERATURE:

McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal (2006: 76–79, 115–138) [R]
Chapter 4 (pp. 115–138) of this book is about immigration (in the US). Pp. 76–79 of chapter 3 present a simple extension of MR related to the immigration discussion.

Lizzeri and Persico (2004) [R]
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002)
Hypotheses on the effect of suffrage.

Husted and Kenny (1997)
Lott and Kenny (1999)
Empirical studies on the effect of extending the franchise with respect to various characteristics.

4. Party politics

TOPIC 4

MAJORITARIAN POLITICS

POLICY SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

TWO-ISSUE POLITICS (CLEAVAGES)

The topics so far have featured political parties as highly stylised actors. However, the fact that parties (such as left vs right) are normally committed to specific policies – supported by distinct groups of the electorate – has implications for how distributive outcomes split on partisan lines. Furthermore, allowing for much more richly defined party actors helps to identify the effects of 'cleavage' issues: policies (on 'values' such as, for example, race or religion) that divide parties and voters in distinct camps.

LITERATURE:

Pontusson and Rueda (2010) [R]
Pontusson and Rueda (2008)
Wittman (1973, 1983)
Theory and evidence with respect to differential performance across party lines.

Stegmueller (2013) [R]
Roemer (2005)
Lupu and Pontusson (2011)
Models incorporating 'cleavage' issues.

5. Specific welfare transfers

TOPIC 5

MAJORITARIAN POLITICS

REDISTRIBUTION FROM POOR TO RICH

State spending has so far been represented as a lump-sum transfer. But such a general tax and transfer system conceals many different types of spending – healthcare, education, unemployment, etc. – which have distinct underlying logic. Education, for example, it has been argued, is one type of spending which could reverse the direction of redistribution from the poor to the rich. Similarly, treating welfare spending as insurance – rather than pure redistribution – leads to different implications.

LITERATURE:

Fernandez and Rogerson (1995, 1996)
The role of education.

Moene and Wallerstein (2003) [R]
Moene and Wallerstein (2001)
The role of insurance.

Persson and Tabelline (2000: 123–154)
Models of and evidence (plus additional references) on other types of spending: pensions, regional transfers, unemployment insurance.

6. Electoral systems

TOPIC 6

The topics so far have had a largely majoritarian underpinning. Majoritarianism, however, is not the only electoral system in town. Topic 6 pits majoritarianism against proportional representation both with respect to their distributive effects across the population and their origins in varying distributive differences.

MAJORITARIAN VS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

LITERATURE:

Iversen and Soskice (2006, 2009) [R]
Contrasts majoritarian and proportional representation systems with respect to their effect on redistribution. Iversen and Soskice (2009) offers a historical explanation.

Persson and Tabellini (2001)
Summary of empirical findings.

Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) [R]
Kreuzer (2010)
Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2010)
A study (with a critique and a reply) on the economic origins of electoral systems.

PART II: TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION

PART II

In the second part of the seminar, we step away from individual representation and focus on interactions between representation and redistribution at the aggregate level. Here, the unit of representation is a territory such as a state or a region within a country, or a country within a supranational organisation. Because representation ultimately pertains to individuals, a crucial theme in this part is malapportionment: does a territorial unit's over or under-representation have distributive benefits or costs, respectively? All of the following topics circle around the themes of a territory's representation in a legislature, the resulting benefits or costs it bears as well as the territory's population size and structure.

7. The US: One person, one vote

TOPIC 7

The 'reapportionment revolution' of the 1960s in the US is perhaps the best starting point for thinking about territorial representation. In the short space of a decade, the US House of Representatives underwent a major re-districting transformation towards *equal* representation. The overarching questions are: 1) what did the malapportionment of Congress amount to? 2) what was at stake? 3) how was it resolved?

EQUAL REPRESENTATION

and 4) what were the consequences? There are interesting relations to the next topic that you can explore.

LITERATURE:

Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002) [R]
Hanson and Crew (1973)
McCubbins and Schwartz (1988)
Erikson (1973)
Discussions of the 1960s case, including relations to the next topic (8).

Ansolabehere and Snyder (2008: 187–240) [R]
A very extensive discussion, including of the implications of the 1960s re-districting phenomenon. Read this together with Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002).

Cutrone and McCarty (2006)
Lee (2000)
Theories of coalition formation and legislative bargaining.

8. The US: Demographic change

TOPIC 8

THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE

The US provides an excellent example not just of the goal – and consequences – of equal representation but also of the dramatic changes wrought by demographic shifts. In this sense, 1920 was unique: this was the first year in which – according to the decennial census – urban Americans became a majority of the population. During the next almost decade, the battle for representation in Congress was fought along the urban-rural divide until, finally, urban representation caught up with urban demography just in time for the Democratic New Deal era.

This topic is perhaps a bit more complex in that there is no *single* study that relates all facets of the representative and distributive issues of the era – you would have to piece these together from the readings below as well as from any additional literature you find (see the references in these papers).

LITERATURE:

Anderson (2015)
Eagles (1986)
Histories of the 1920s debacle. Start with the Anderson text to get a sense of the issues.

Key (1964: 182–190)
A very brief overview of the predominant political and economic issues in the period of 1920–1940. Read this for some context into the era.

Eagles (1989)
Key (1959)
A history of the 1920s debacle.

9. The EU: Power & Budgets

TOPIC 9

A recurring bone of contention in the EU is state representation. Particularly, large states such as Germany often complain about being *unfairly* represented in comparison to small states such as Luxembourg. There are at least two topics of interest here: 1) what exactly does the complaint amount to? and 2) granted that, does it have an impact on how the EU distributes its budget?

OVER AND UNDER-REPRESENTATION

LITERATURE:

Rodden (2002) [R]
Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) [R]
Kauppi and Widgrén (2007)
Hypotheses and evidence on how state representation affects the EU budgetary distribution.

Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006)
Relates the topic to the themes of PART I *and, specifically, the role of political parties.*

PART III: WRAPPING UP

PART III

We finish with a 'big topic' which – in the post-presentation discussion – should allow us to pull insights from the preceding themes.

10. Democratic stability

TOPIC 10

Suppose that we have a democracy characterised – at least minimally – by the presence of universal suffrage and equal and fair elections. The question is: when, if at all, is inequality good or bad news for democratic stability, i.e. under what conditions can the latter survive? Does inequality have a negative effect on this survival and if yes, why and when?

SELF-ENFORCING DEMOCRACY

INEQUALITY OF WHAT?

LITERATURE:

Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek (2007) [R]
Przeworski (2006, 2010: 84–92) [R]
Przeworski (2005)
The effect of inequality on democratic stability.

Przeworski (2008)
Who threatens democratic stability, the poor or the rich?

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